In .everal recent srudies of .he way individual economic units might learn their parts of a ralional expectations equilibrium, tbe learning process bas been modeled I\!i " recursive algorithm in which individuals' expectation. depend upon tbeir observations of v"riables that arc influenced by others' expectations. The critical tool for establishing tbat .he learning pro· cess converges to an equilibrium has been a theorem of Ljung [I] that gives sumcient conditions for convergence of a general class of recursive stocbaslic estimation algoritllms. (See, in particular. Marcet and Sargen. [3, 4] and Woodford [6] . ) It seems reasonable to hope tha. tbe same approach will also help us to understand lhe process by which tbe players in a noncooperative game might learn their parts of a Nash equilibrium. a particular kind of rational expectations eqUilibrium.
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In tbe analysis of a noncooperative game, one's attention is n.turally drawn to the question whether the learning process has been modeled as, a "decentralized" process, in tbe sense that .he players are aUowcd to have independent information and that they arc allowed to act independently even if they have the same inrormation. \Vc show that the learning behavior described by Ljung', class of algo rithms does not bave this decentralized character. Thus, Ljung's approach may not be so attractive for the analysis of learning behavior in gamcs-or indeed for lhe analysis of any kind of dCL't'ntrali:ed learning process.
LjunS's method consisL, essentially of two theorems, Theorems 1 and 4 in [1] , which wc refer to as l.jung·, First and Second Theorems. rc-specrively. Ljuug's First Theorem require. , onc to es tablish that the sequenc'C of forecasts generated by th(.' learn ing algorithm contains a bounded subsequence. Because this boundedncss property is g,encr:.JlJy dilftcuh to verify. Lj ung nexl introduces" "projecti on operator" according to which, wbenever (he algorithm yields an ··obviously bad" forecasl [he forecast is replaced wit h "something mon: rC.,Jsonuhle: ' Ljung's Second Theorem then gives a coudition that (:-0 usually easier to ve rify than boundcd w ncss--a kind ur Lyapunov condition--which guardntees that the sequence of forecasts generated by tbe-pr(~jf!L'li01r algorithm (hut not necessarily those generated by the original :dgorit hm ) will converge lO the c.orrect forecast.
The macroeconomic npplie'lIiom of Lj un g's method that appear in [3,4. 6 ] arc all applicatio ns or [he Second Theorem. inv olving the projection operator. The idea in thcs.c applications 5ceOl!oO to be that everyone is sl:t:in g the same data -pe rh aps even [hat a small collection of "'pert forecasters are gencraling (he forecasts to be used by the partiCipanL') in thc economy-and that therefo re the ro recasL< sho uld move together. Furthermore, it is then rensonahle that the forecasters will all invoke the projection operator lOgether. But when ind ividuals have diflerelll information . they will no t generally arrive a t "obviously bad" foreca,t, together, and they will therefore nol invoke the projection operator lOgcther-~md. therefore, as we 'how, Ljung', Second Theorem does not apply.
Let us try to apply Ljung\ Sccoml Theorem (10 be dc-<;cribed shortly) to a simple model in whi ch, at each period / ~ 1, 2. .... ench person j ob""",,, the val ue of a real variable : , (1) and then. based upon his observatio ns =/( I) . .. 
ami lhe Nas h equ iJibrium and th e rational expet.:ta tioIls equiJibrium ..:o illdde (wc igno re boum.lary co nditio ns):
I r each player fo rms hi~ fo recas t hy averaging his past observa ti ons. i.e., if and if we work with den'm imls from the ~qui1i bJ'ium (i.e .. (I 1 = iJ:z = 0 I. then Eqs. I I) 'lnd (2) uescribe the movement of expectations " "U ohscrva tions over lime. and wc ca n ask whelh~r the p!<iyers \\liH eventually "Iea rn" to ha ve COrrect expectations x , ·· about oue another and therefore learn to tnke the equilibrium actions qt· . In o ther wo rds J if th e system's i:1w uf m odon is given by ( I ) and (2), \1,IilI it cOll v.:rgc [0 its equilibrium?
Stoehastic difference cqualio n ,),_ ,toms of rht form given b), (1 ) and (2) arc called by Ljung " rct:ursivc scochastic estimation algorilhms." His method fo r analyz.in g the asy mptotic propcni!!s of these algori thms is tu 1 I Ljung's First Theorem requires that the forecasts lie in a bounded arca infinitely often, i.e., tbat we can find a bounded subsequence of {.t(I)}. This is usually a dillicult condition to check, even for systems as simple as ours. ro avoid this dillieulty, Ljung provides his Second Theorem, for which he modifies the forecasting algorithms (2) into the following projeclion .algorithm, which we denote by (2'):
Let D be a bounded subset of R' with a nonempty interior; Let C be a closed subset of the interior of D, called the algorithm's (argel set; Let (p(t)l be a sequence of points' in C; And instead of (2), the forecast X(I) is given by Algorithm (2') diJfers from (2) in that the forcx:asts in (2') arc made to lie in a prcspecified bounded set D by substituting, for any f o = x(r) If the forecasts are dcs,ribed by a projection "Igorithm such as (2'), then at each time I each individual must choose x ,{r) = x,(I), or else each must cboose X,(I) = PI(t). Each Jljlrson must therefore know whether or not .i(r) e D in order to know whether he should invoke the projection operator and thereby revert to p ,(I). In particular, he must know the other person's unprojec~d forecase .<-,(1). This is clearly unsatisfactory. If our intent is to explain how individuals might attain equilibrium even when they do not start out knowing what one another will do, then wc do not want to assume that they know oDe anothers' forecasts.
It is natural, then, to def1l1c a deeenrrallied projection algorithm as ODC in which each individual has a projection operator that be invokes intiept!l1denrl,., whenever hi, own for"".st tics outside a given set (say. the. support of his own beliefs about tbe others' equilibrium actions). In our example. then, we would have; for ;= t. 2. the foUowing. denoted by(r):
Lel D, be a bounded subsel of !i1 wilh a noncmply inlerior.
Lel C, be a nonemply closed subsel of Ihe interior of D,. Let l p ,(t) l be a sequence of points in C,.
The forecasl x,(t) i, given hy ( { .i';(I)
where
(2"a) in provin£ that, if Condition L is satisfied, the projection operalor could in fact only be invoked finilely many times, so that an algorithm of the form (2') wiU evcntuaUy be of the form (2'a), and will therefore behave ·asymptotically like it' ADE. Existence of <uch an interior limit poinl is not guaranleed for a decentralized algorithm of the form (2 " ), and it is not clear how the proof of Ljung's Second Theorem could be nltered 10 include drxcntrali,.ed algorithms.
There is a second difficulty in applying Ljung's Second Theorem to t!ccentralized forecasting problems. Suppose that, after al~ we could prove a version of the Secoml Theorem that would coyer decentralized projection II1goritbms. Now consider the impfications of Condition L. This condition An alternative interpretation is that ConditioD L is a kind of cO'lsistenl beliefs condition, similar to the consistency of prior beliefs that plays such an important role in justifying Nash equilibrium via common-knowledge arguments. But the primary reason for studying models of learning is 10 explain the attainment of equilibrium when individuals do not bave full information about one another. Therefore Condition L, and Ljung's projection operators, do not Seem to be appropriate for modcling decenrrolized processes of decision making and expectation fonnation. It may be, however, that decentralit.ed projection operators sueh as (2" ) are in Cact good descriptions oC the way individuals Corm expectations. If so, il is an important question Cor further rCl;earch whether there is n deeentrali7.cd analogue of Ljung's Second Theorem, " tbeorem Ibal will give us conditions under whicb decentralized recur$i .. stocbastic estimation algorithms converge.
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